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Microenterprises are an important source of income for many 
poor people in low-income countries. Recognizing this, 
governments and donors have sought to enhance the well-being of 
these small firms, usually through credit programs. 2 These 
efforts increasingly use semi-formal institutions such as non-
governmental organizations, specialized institutions that 
concentrate on small businesses, and cooperatives--particularly 
credit unions. 3 Much experience has been accumulated the past 
several decades on how to form these semi-formal organization, 
but relatively little analysis has been done on what happens to 
these organizations over time, especially when they perform 
increasingly complex functions such as handling targeted loans 
and mobilizing deposits. 
Credit unions are the focus of the discussion that follows, 
the main objective being to analyze the strengths and weakness of 
these organizations in handling loans to microenterprises. The 
discussion begins with historical background on microenterprises 
and credit unions, followed by an analysis of major issues that 
might be considered before channelling funds through credit 
unions to microenterprises. The subsequent section of the paper 
summarizes the results of programs aimed at developing credit 
unions in the Dominican Republic and several other Latin American 
1I have drawn heavily on the work of others in this paper, 
especially Robert Christen, Carlos E. Cuevas, John Gadway, 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Douglas H. Graham, Jeffrey Poyo, and 
Robert c. Vogel 
2Policy makers often use supposed "credit needs" to justify 
these programs. Numerous studies have shown that operators of 
small firms often rank credit near the top of their wish list. 
It is unclear, nevertheless, how many of these credit wishes are 
based on legitimate economic opportunities, and how may are the 
result of rent seeking or poor managerial skills (Kilby, Liedholm 
and Meyer, 1984). 
3The term semi-formal is here used to indicate an 
organization or institution that provides loan and possibly 
deposit services without the supervision of any central monetary 
authority, but often under some government-issued charter or 
license. 
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countries to illustrate these issues. The concluding section 
provides guidelines for policy makers who wish to channel funds 
through credit unions to microenterprises. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Until recently, microenterprises and credit unions were 
mostly the concern of individuals and groups that were interested 
in promoting these activities. Only in the past few years have 
researchers delved into these topics, mostly because of policy 
makers' heightened concerns with poverty. 
Microenterprise credit programs 
The literature on microenterprises and associated credit 
programs expanded rapidly during the 1980s (Boomgard 1989; 
Levitsky and Prasad 1987; Meyer and Nagarajan 1989; Webster 
1989). This growth mirrors the sharp expansion in a wide variety 
of credit efforts aimed at small businesses in low-income 
countries. This includes loan guarantee programs and discount 
facilities in central banks that attempt to induce banks to lend 
more to small businesses, the formation of new banks that lend 
mostly to microenterprises, lending by private non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) , and linking formal and informal forms of 
finance to provide financial services to small businesses. As 
was the case in earlier efforts to provide credit to operators of 
small farms, most recent effort has gone into designing new 
organizations that can provide financial services to small firms. 
Increasingly, NGOs have come to play a major role in these 
efforts. It is not unusual to find dozens or even hundreds of 
NGOs in a low-income country that provide loans and other 
assistance to microenterprises, credit unions being only one of 
the NGOs involved. 
There has also been a good deal of experimentation in using 
various combinations of technical assistance, training, and loans 
to assist microenterprises. These lending activities can be 
arranged along a continuum. On one end of the continuum loans 
are used as a reward for successfully completing a program aimed 
at training microentrepreneurs--the CARVAHAL program in Colombia 
being one of the earliest examples of this. At the other end of 
the continuum, operators of microenterprises are given little 
else than a loan, a strategy labelled the minimalist approach. 
The lending efforts by ACCION International in Latin America is 
an example of this. Between these two extremes are a large 
variety of other programs that involve various combinations of 
training, technical assistance, credit, and other development 
activities. The Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh, the Bandan Kredit 
Kecamatan (BKK) in Indonesia, the Small Business Guarantee and 
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Finance Corporation in the Philippines, and the Sistema 
Multiplicadora de la Microempresa (SIMME) in Guatemala are 
illustrative examples of these mixed arrangements. 
With the increased interest in developing small businesses 
there has also been an expansion in research done on 
microenterprises and on the informal sector in general 
(Chickering and Salahdine 1991). Scholars at Michigan State 
University were innovators in this analysis through their 
research in countries such as Sierra Leone, Egypt, Bangladesh, 
and Thailand that clarified the importance of microenterprises 
(Liedholm and Mead 1987). Hernando de Soto's work in Peru 
further showed the importance of these small businesses, how they 
succeeded despite government opposition, and how important they 
are in helping poor people. This early work spawned large 
numbers of microenterprise development projects that were 
subsequently funded by the World Bank, other regional development 
banks, bilateral development agencies, and national governments. 
Credit unions 
Credit unions are grassroots organizations that emerged in 
Germany during the later half of the 1800s from two strains of 
cooperative development activities, both of which were aimed at 
easing poverty (Banerjee and others 1993). The financial 
cooperatives founded by Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch were 
concentrated in urban areas, stressed paying dividends to 
members, and applied the limited liability principle. Friederich 
Raiffeisen later focused his efforts on organizing credit 
cooperatives in rural areas. These cooperatives often paid no 
dividends, operated under joint liability, and championed the 
cooperative spirit. By the early part of the 1900s these two 
cooperative strains merged and spread throughout Germany with 
nearly one-third of the rural households being members (Banerjee 
and others 1993). 
The credit cooperative notion soon migrated both east and 
west. In the late 1800s the Japanese adapted the Raiffeisen 
model, formed credit cooperatives that later matured into 
powerful farmers' associations, and then exported these 
cooperatives to both Taiwan and Korea (Izumida 1992). Later, in 
the early 1900s, credit cooperatives took root in Canada and in 
the United States, and flourished during the 1930s and 1940s in 
the form of credit unions (Magill 1991). Mutual finance 
institutions with European roots also appeared during the early 
1900s in the several parts of Latin America, mostly among 
European immigrants. In most cases these were urban based 
organizations, but at least in Uruguay, credit cooperatives using 
Raiffaisen principles also flourished in rural areas (Poyo 1993). 
After World War II donors in North America, several religions 
groups, and later the Peace Corps began promoting credit unions 
in low-income countries. This included forming individual credit 
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unions, founding national associations of credit unions, and also 
setting up regional organizations comprised of national 
associations. In Africa, credit union growth in Togo and the 
cameroon was particularly impressive during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Cuevas 1992). Similar growth in credit unions occurred in Latin 
America 1 initially through efforts by the Catholic Church. 
By the end of the 1980s there were in 67 low-income 
countries about 17 thousand credit unions, with nearly 9 million 
members, that were affiliated with the international apex 
organization for the credit union, the World council of Credit 
unions (WOCCU). These credit unions handled the equivalent of 
nearly $US2 billion in deposits and share capital. Informed 
guesses are that 10 to 20 percent of the loans make by these 
credit unions are extend to small businesses (Marion 1991, p.8). 
If the volume of microenterprise lending is about 20 percent, 
this would mean that some 1.7 millions small businesses were 
receiving about the equivalent of $US300 million in loans from 
credit unions in low-income countries in the late 1980s. 
Credit unions as conduits 
As part of earlier efforts to provide loans to operators of 
small farms in low-income countries, a few donors channelled 
funds through credit unions for this purpose during the 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s. One of the earliest efforts was in 
Ecuador where in 1965 the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (A.I.D.) sponsored a directed agricultural production 
credit program that provided funds to farmers through 17 rural 
credit unions (Keeler and others 1973). The loans involved 
concessionary interest rates and were accompanied by technical 
assistance, but the overall results of this program were 
disappointing. Loans were extended to relatively few borrowers, 
had a weak impact on production and income, and stimulate little 
enthusiasm among credit union managers. After experimenting with 
this project for a few years A.I.D. ceased funding it in the rnid-
1970s. 
In 1974 A.I.D. funded a parallel project in Africa that 
focused on strengthening the regional credit union organization 
(ACOSCA), promoting credit union development in Lesotho and the 
Cameroon, and also funding pilot programs that provided directed 
agricultural production credit through credit unions in these two 
countries (Bierman and others 1977). over the next few years the 
Agency funded other targeted credit programs for operators of 
small farms that channelled funds through additional credit 
unions and other organizations. 
Overall, the results of these efforts in Latin America and 
Africa were disappointing. In many cases loan recovery rates 
were low, the costs of administering programs were high, and 
inflation often eroded the purchasing power of the funds in these 
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programs. Several A.I.D. sponsored evaluations of the directed 
credit efforts in Africa reported that most of them had failed 
(Deschamps 1989; Mindock 1983; Pollard and others 1992). These 
projects failed to encourage deposit mobilization, they failed to 
collect many of their loans, they failed to enhance the financial 
vitality of the credit unions that handled A.I.D. funds, they 
failed to protect the purchasing power of the funds lent, and 
they failed to provide sustained access to formal finance. 
In the mid-1970s the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
began funding a series of projects that channelled money through 
the regional credit union organization in Latin America (COLAC) 
for on-lending to national credit union associations, member 
credit unions, and finally to credit union members. 4 Through a 
series of projects the Bank gave or lent about $100 million to 
COLAC for on-lending over a ten year period. These projects 
included expanded lending by credit unions to farmers, to 
operators of small non-farm businesses, and also to female 
entrepreneurs. Most of the loans were made at concessionary 
rates, inflation was a problem in most of the countries where 
credit unions lent IDB funds, many of the programs experienced 
loan recovery problems, and some of the country associations and 
individual credit unions that used these funds became insolvent. 
By the late 1980s the IDB ceased funding COLAC. This cessation 
was part of a new IDB approach that stressed positive real rates 
of interest and also emphasized the sustainability of financial 
organizations that handled IDB funds. 
No comprehensive evaluation has been done of IDB's credit 
programs with COLAC. Several partial evaluations, however, 
illustrate some of the problems that emerged in these efforts. 
An evaluation of COLAC in 1990, for example, reported that the 
purchasing power of its loan portfolio was seriously eroded by 
low interest rates, inflation, and loan defaults (McGuire and 
others 1990). Authors of several other studies criticized the 
IDB/COLAC program because it discouraged deposit mobilization and 
supported inflexible interest rate policies (Christen and Vogel 
1984; Vogel 1988b) 
Traditionally, most credit unions have been borrower-
dominated. Credit union philosophy stresses the provision of 
loans to people of modest means at "reasonable rates of interest'' 
(Dublin and Dublin 1983). Reasonable is usually defined to mean 
low and fixed rates for borrowers, resulting in even lower rates 
being paid on members' shares or deposits. For many years in 
4The Agency for International Development, the Interamerican 
Foundation, and several other donors likewise provided funds for 
on lending by COLAC. In most cases these funds ended up being 
highly subsidized through low and inflexible nominal interest 
rates. 
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Latin America it was common for credit unions to charge a simple 
interest rate of 1 percent per month (12 percent per year) on 
loans. Because many countries in Latin America endured rates of 
inflation during the 1970s and 1980s that were usually in double 
digits, sometimes in triple digits, and occasionally in quadruple 
digits, real rates of interest on IDB/COLAC loans and on credit 
union deposits were often highly negative. Credit unions were 
particularly slow in adjusting interest rates to onslaughts of 
inflation. As a result, the purchasing power of many of the loan 
portfolios rapidly melted in countries such as Bolivia, Peru, 
costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. 
The results of the IDB/COLAC activities and credit union 
development efforts in Africa would have been more positive if 
macroeconomic conditions had been favorable. Rampant inflation 
in many countries made it extremely difficult to develop any type 
of financial institution during the 1970s and 1980s. Political 
instability, slow or negative rates of economic growth, and abuse 
of financial institutions in general by governments and donors 
created a hostile environment for financial institutions in many 
countries. Nascent credit unions, in countries such as Uganda 
and Bolivia, had no chance of growing given the economic turmoil 
that bedeviled their societies. In my opinion 1 dogmatic credit 
union philosophy and policies, especially regarding interest 
rates, enhanced the vulnerability of credit unions to these 
economic shocks. 
CREDIT UNION STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Credit unions have their strengths and weaknesses when it 
comes to development efforts. Special care must be taken to 
avoid turning strengths into weakness through external intrusions 
into these small and fragile institutions. 
Strengths 
The most attractive feature of credit unions is their 
ability to handle small transactions cheaply. In many cases most 
members of a credit union live in the same village or 
neighborhood, or work for the same organization. As long as the 
cooperative is relatively small and is also managed by members of 
the group, the marginal costs of screening creditworthy borrowers 
is nil for both the credit union and its members. Loans are 
essentially based on character; the reputation of borrowers and 
their share capital in the cooperative substitute for other forms 
of collateral that are more costly for borrowers to provide and 
for lenders to evaluate. Credit unions likewise have cost 
advantages when it comes to loan collection. Instead of using 
legal procedures to recover loans or to capture collateral, small 
credit unions can employ various types of social sanctions, 
including shunning, and even extra-legal procedures. 
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In some cases the overhead costs of credit unions are low 
because promoters or managers donate all or part of their time, 
donors subsidize the formation and operation of the credit 
unions, or other organizations donates facilities in which credit 
unions are housed. A church, for example, may donate time and 
facilities to credit union activities as part of its missionary 
efforts 1 while a company may provide free facilities to enhance 
employee morale and to also lessen the time employees spend in 
doing financial transactions. 
From a donor or government's perspective 1 another advanr.age 
of credit unions is that they often provide financial services to 
people of modest means. In countries that are stressing 
privatization, the fact that credit unions are NGOs further 
enhances their desirability. These characteristics have 
increasingly attracted outside funds that are aimed at helping 
designated "beneficiaries:" operators of small farms, owners of 
microenterprises, and women, for example. 
An additional strength of credit unions is the close tie 
they maintain between saving and borrowing. Under normal 
conditions members of a credit union know they can usually 
receive a loan for some multiple of their share capital or 
deposits--a form of insurance. Members earn the right to 
borrower through saving. In part, savings performance is used as 
a low-cost screening device by credit unions. Individuals who 
lack the ability or discipline to save are excluded from loans 
automatically and individuals who save only small amounts have 
access to only small loans. Most members enhance their capacity 
to borrow by expanding their ownerships of shares or their 
deposits. Since the discipline needed to save is the same 
quality of character that is required to exercise the discipline 
to repay obligations, savings performance is an inexpensive way 
for credit unions to screen loan applicants for financial 
discipline. 
The agency problem5 
At first glance, credit unions appear to be simple 
organizations with uncomplicated procedures. In terms of 
economic relationships among participants, however, they are 
complex. Recently, relationships in financial institutions have 
been analyzed using the notions of contracts, principals, and 
agents. Jensen and Meckling define the agency relationship 
as .••• "explicit or implicit contracts in which one or more 
persons (the Principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
take actions on behalf of the principal(s). The contract 
involves the delegation of some decision-making authority to the 
5This section relies heavily on Poyo 1992b and Poyo, 
Aguilera, and Gonzales 1992. 
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agent." The primary agent problem is to form contracts in such a 
way that the interests of the principal are protected. This 
entails costs in the form of monitoring expenditures, 
transactions costs, moral hazard costs, legal enforcement 
expenses, and other costs of collecting and processing 
information. 
Agent problems are common and also complex in financial 
transactions because of the fungibility of financial instruments, 
the variety of contracts that are often involved, and because of 
the time dimension in many of these transactions: receive-or-pay 
now and pay-or-receive later. These problems are least 
complicated in credit unions that rely entirely on share capital 
for loanable funds. 
Rudimentary credit unions are often organized because of 
altruistic concerns and typically require members to purchase 
shares. These funds are then lent to a few members based on some 
multiple of the value of shares owned by the borrower. 
Additional share capital may be collected from borrowers by 
withholding small portions of their loans. In the simplest 
credit unions the principals are the members who contribute share 
capital and the borrowers are agents. The agency problem in 
these simple credit unions is dealt with in several ways. First, 
membership in the group is generally restricted to individuals 
who are trustworthy and loans are only made to people who are 
judged to be creditworthy. Both membership and lending decisions 
are based on information about individual members accumulated 
over time by other members of the group. Thus, the agency costs 
of collecting and analyzing information are minimal. Second, the 
groups are able to employ a wide variety of inexpensive informal 
sanctions to enforce contracts. Third, some members are also 
able to "withdraw" their equity in the organization by taking a 
loan equal to the amount of their shares and then defaulting, 
thereby voiding their agent status. 6 
Agency problems become more complex as credit unions grow by 
adding retained earnings to their capital bases instead of 
returning profits to members as dividends (Poyo, Aguilera and 
Gonzalez, 1992). The ownership of these retained earnings is 
ambiguous in that they are owned collectively, not individually 
by the members. They are much like the economic commons in which 
society is the principal that exercises little control over 
agents wishing to exploit the resource. Instead of relying 
solely on voluntary leadership, these larger credit unions 
typically employ managers who essentially become agents for the 
owners of share capital and the retained earnings. Managers may 
6The ability to "withdraw" share capital by defaulting on 
loans results in the capital base in a credit union being more 
unstable than is the case in a privately owned bank. 
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have objectives that conflict with those of their principals, 
including high salaries, obtaining cheap loans, having nice 
places to work, and going to national and international meetings. 
Even more complex agent problems arise in credit unions that 
augment the volume of loanable funds by mobilizing voluntary 
deposits. Depositors then are the principals and borrowers the 
agents. Some of their concerns may conflict as depositors wish 
to be paid a high interest rate (or dividend) on their savings, 
while borrowers benefit from low interest rates. A conflict of 
interest may arise when leaders of the credit union are also 
substantial borrowers and likewise responsible for setting 
interest rate policies. 
Agency problems are further complicated when credit unions 
receive funds from governments or donors for on-lending to 
members. In these cases credit unions become agents for the 
provider of funds. If the funds are passed through regional and 
national credit union organizations additional layers of agency 
problems accompany the insertion of funds. This funding may 
alter the relationship of regional and national organizations 
with their member cooperatives. Instead of providing technical 
assistance, supervision, and prudential regulation for their 
member organizations, the second or third tier institution may 
orient their activities largely toward sustaining itself via 
margins earned on funds passing downward through the system. The 
relationship may be further clouded by outside funding that is 
misconstrued as being a grant because it involves beneficiaries, 
political decisions, and donors. 
Transaction cost problems 
Transaction costs are closely associated with agency 
problems and are also a major drag on the performance of 
financial markets, especially in reaching poor people in rural 
areas. For credit unions these costs include the expenses of 
mobilizing and maintaining deposits along with the expenses 
associated with extending and recovering loans. Most of these 
costs are incurred in assembling, storing, and processing 
information. Credit union members likewise incur transaction 
costs in using the services provided by the credit union, both 
loans and deposits. Most of these costs are in the form of 
opportunity costs involved in time lost in transacting business 
with the credit unions. Depending on the financial technology 
used by the credit union, transaction costs may be shifted from 
cooperative to members, or the reverse. Banks often employ 
procedures that shift additional borrowing costs to non-preferred 
borrowers as a rationing device. This appears to be less common 
in credit unions (Baydas and Cuevas 1990). 
The importance of these transaction costs, both for the 
credit union and for members, increases as credit unions grow. 
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When the cooperative is small and draws most of its membership 
from a single village or from the employees of a single business 
the transaction costs for both members and the cooperative are 
modest. It is inexpensive to screen individuals for both loans 
and integrity based on the accumulated knowledge other members 
have about the individual. The need to collect additional 
information about the individuals is usually minimal. Likewise 
the costs of members doing transactions is modest when the 
cooperative is located close to where members work or live. 
Informality and the willingness of members to work as managers of 
the credit union for little-or-no compensation further limitR 
transaction costs. 
As credit unions grow in number of members as well as in 
range of financial services offered, transactions costs are 
likely to increase. Open credit unions may include members who 
are from another village or company and this forces management to 
assemble costly information in order to screen members and 
borrowers. Distance also imposes additional transaction costs on 
members who live far from the credit union's office. The 
increasing size of the organization also requires hiring more 
professional staff which further increases costs, including using 
more formal and costly record-keeping systems. Depending on the 
financial technologies used by the evolving credit unions, scope 
and scale economies may offset some of these increased 
transaction costs. 
The transaction costs of a credit union will also likely 
increase when they begin to mobilize deposits. Still further 
increases in transaction costs can be expected when the 
cooperative lends funds obtained from outside the credit union. 
If these are government or donor funds they are likely targeted 
and require reports for the provider of the funds. External 
examinations and evaluations of the impact of credit use will 
also subject credit unions to still further transaction costs. 
Prudential regulation 
A similar evolution occurs in the need for prudential 
regulation (Chaves 1993; Cuevas 1992; Poyo 1992a). A key feature 
of credit unions is their legal ambiguity and who, if anyone, is 
responsible for their supervision. In many countries credit 
unions are chartered by a ministry or office of cooperatives. 
These offices are often also responsible for the promotion of 
cooperatives, creating possible conflicts of interest between 
supervision and promotion. Seldom do these offices have the 
technical expertise to do careful financial audits. 
When credit unions are small and lending only share capital 
and a few retained earnings, they may function effectively 
through self policing (Branch 1992). A national organization may 
assist in this by enhancing the quality of management, through 
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some supervision, and by providing liquidity in times of 
emergency. The strongest incentive for people to continue to 
support a credit union--thereby regulating its performance--is 
the confidence that it will persist. The problems of prudential 
regulation increase as the amount of retained earnings used in 
lending increases, as credit unions begin to mobilize deposits, 
and in cases where they receive outside funds for lending. 7 
In most low-income countries the national association of 
credit unions--if there be such--has nominal responsibility for 
prudential regulation of its member credit unions. 8 The 
effectiveness of this regulation is often hampered, however, by 
the limited technical capability of its staff, the conflict of 
interest in any organization that is responsible for promoting as 
well as regulating, and agency problems in these associations. 
In many cases national associations are dependent on subsidies 
and government or donor funds for their survival. This often 
leads the employees of these associations to use most of their 
creative energy seeking subsidies and funds rather than in 
prudentially regulating their member organizations. 
In some countries such as Colombia and Peru the 
responsibility for prudential regulation of credit unions has 
been given to a government agency responsible for supervising 
banks. In other counties such as The Gambia, there have been 
discussions about the Central Bank assuming these 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, many of these bank-supervising 
agencies in low-income countries struggle to examine commercial 
banks. It is unclear if many of these agencies have the capacity 
and appropriate examination technology to supervise properly 
credit unions. Furthermore, requiring credit unions and other 
semi-formal financial institutions to provide bank-like 
information for examinations, maintain reserves, and to meet 
other standard banking requirements may destroy many of these 
fragile institutions. The conflict between prudential regulation 
and the costs of operating these organizations is exacerbated 
when substantial amounts of deposits are involved. 
7A famous bank robber in the United States by the name of 
Willie Sutton was once asked why he robbed banks. He replied 
••. "that was where the money was." When credit unions begin to 
mobilize deposits they take on more of the characteristics of a 
bank and are more susceptible to theft, thus the need for more 
prudential regulation to assure that the contracts between the 
credit union and its depositors are fulfilled. 
8In some cases these regulatory functions also may be 
provided by some outside organization that is providing short-
term technical assistance aimed at building or strengthening 
credit unions. 
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Normally, regulators encourage a financial intermediary to 
diversify its loan portfolio in order to spread loan recovery 
risks across various activities. Because of their nature credit 
unions find it difficult to diversify. When they are small they 
often concentrate their loan portfolios in a restricted area and 
in only a few economic activities. As a result, bad weather or 
other factors may adversely affect the ability of a large 
percentage of the borrowers to repay their loans, thus 
threatening the viability of the organization. The capital 
structure of the cooperative is likewise fragile when members can 
essential withdraw their share capital by not repaying their 
loans. There is little that prudential regulatory can do to help 
credit unions--especially those that are small--to avoid these 
risks. 
CREDIT UNIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 
Promoters of credit unions were optimistic in the 1960s 
about the prospects for developing a large credit union system in 
Latin America. A number of countries such as Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, The Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Peru were 
experiencing rapid growth in credit unions. This optimism led to 
the formation of COLAC and the seeking of outside funds to 
further fuel the growth of these cooperatives. As suggested 
earlier, few of these hopes during the 1960s were realized during 
the next two decades. Inflation, economic stagnation and 
decline, and too little flexibility in policies in the credit 
union system resulted in major deterioration in the strength of 
many credit unions in the region. The large infusion of outside 
funds may have added to these problems by increasing agency 
problems, by increasing transaction costs, and by intensifying 
prudential regulation difficulties. Research done in The 
Dominican Republic and in several other countries in Latin 
America illustrate these problems. 
The Dominican Republic9 
The history of credit unions in the Dominican Republic 
parallels that of credit unions in other Latin American 
countries; they have enjoyed several periods of growth and 
suffered several serious declines. Credit unions were started 
almost 50 years ago when the Catholic Church began promoting them 
to assist poor people (Poyo 1992a) . By the late 1940s there were 
enough credit unions to justify establishing a national 
federation (FEDOCOOP). From then until 1957 both membership and 
9In this section I draw heavily on work done by Jeffrey 
Poyo, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and their colleagues. Parallel work 
by Graham and others in Niger to develop viable credit unions is 
also interesting (Graham 1987}. 
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number of credit unions grew rapidly. Conflict between the 
Church and the government and associated civil unrest, however, 
had an adverse impact on credit unions between the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. After 1963 several donors, including the Agency for 
International Development, injected funds into FEDOCOOP and by 
the late 1970s the total number of credit unions in the country 
had expanded to more than a hundred with 37 thousand members. 
This growth parallelled similar develppments in a number of 
other Latin American countries during the 1950s and 1960s with 
much of it being fueled by the provision of outside funds through 
the regional confederation of Latin American credit unions 
(COLAC). A major reason for forming COLAC was to provide access 
for credit unions to donor funds. Largely through funding by the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the COLAC system of credit 
unions grew rapidly during the 1970s and early 1980s. The 17 
national federations that were COLAC shareholders had about 4 
million credit union members and had loan portfolios that 
amounted to about a half billion dollars by 1988. Although 
FEDOCOOP was a small federation, it played a disproportionate 
role in COLAC. The head of FEDOCOOP was also the president of 
COLAC from 1976 to 1981, a period of rapid growth in COLAC's 
activities. Not surprisingly, FEDOCOOP received substantial 
funding and technical assistance from COLAC during this period, 
possibly too much. 
Credit unions in Latin America in general, and in the 
Dominican Republic in particular, proved to be fragile and 
suffered major reverses during the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s. Inflation, combined with inflexible interest rates, 
eroded the purchasing power of the funds managed by COLAC, by its 
member federations, and by individual credit unions. This was 
accompanied by serious loan recovery problems throughout the 
system and rumors of corruption. FEDOCOOP was one of the first 
country associations to implode. By 1980 many of its member 
credit unions--especially those with open-ended memberships in 
rural areas--became moribund. Subsequently, strong federations 
in countries such as Bolivia, Honduras, and Peru were also 
severely stressed. 
It appears that the fundamental design of these credit union 
efforts was flawed. It stressed the well-being of the borrower 
to the total exclusion of depositors and share holders. The 
provision of concessionary funds from outside weakened the 
resolve of the credit unions to mobilize deposits and share 
capital. This restricted the loanable funds mostly to money 
provided by outside sources and weakened loan recovery 
discipline. In some cases the rapid expansion in loans 
facilitated by infusion of outside funds. lessened the ability of 
credit unions to make creditworthy loans based on accumulated 
information about members. credit unions were faced with the 
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challenge of assembling costly information about new members and 
hiring full-time managers, or making loans based on insufficient 
information. 
Combined with fixed nominal interest rates and accelerating 
inflation the credit unions and their association were 
increasingly turned into dispensers of "economic rents" instead 
of being financial intermediaries. Loan recovery performance 
quickly deteriorated as insiders and other rent seekers colonized 
loans and later failed to repay. 10 Share holders, seeing the 
deterioration in the cooperative, then scrambled to salvage some 
of their share capital by demanding loans at least equal to the 
value of their share contribution and then later defaulting on 
their loans. The credit unions were unable to collect loans and 
were thus unable to repay their loans from the national 
association. In turn, the national association was unable to 
repay loans from COLAC and donors became discouraged by the 
defaults and stopped funding COLAC. 
In 1983 the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) 
funded a pilot project in the Dominican Republic that focused, in 
part, on rehabilitating a few credit unions. The main focus of 
the project was to assist the government-owned agricultural 
development bank (Bagricola) to provide deposit services for the 
first time. From offering no deposit services in 1983 the 
project assisted Bagricola to open 150 thousand deposit accounts 
and mobilize the equivalent of about $US28 million by the end of 
1992. This included helping four credit unions--three of which 
were essentially moribund--to mobilize deposits and to strengthen 
management. 11 A follow-on A.I.D. funded project expanded the 
activities to include a total of 15 credit unions located mostly 
in rural areas. The main purpose of the project was to convert 
these credit unions from paternalistic organizations that were 
borrower dominated and often used as conduits for outside funds, 
to financial institutions that were responsive to market prices 
and to the interests of depositors. 
10There is little difference between justifying the subsidy 
involved in a low interest rate loan and rationalizing the even 
larger subsidy involved in loan default. It is easy to conclude 
that a poor person who receives a cheap loan based on "need," and 
then fails to repay, has the further "need" for loan forgiveness. 
110ne of the four credit unions subsequently dropped out of 
the program. The strongest credit union--possibly the best in 
the country--was located in San Jose de las Matas. It had never 
received loans from the national Federation and was also one of 
the few credit unions in the country to experiment with deposit 
mobilization (Poyo 1993). 
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Instead of providing funds for on-lending, the project 
strengthened credit unions through technical assistance and 
training. This included helping them develop more attractive 
deposit instruments, employing interest rates that were 
competitive on both loans and deposits, and encouraging the 
hiring of full-time professional managers. Also, a new 
association was established to provide on-going technical 
assistance to these restructured credit unions, including the 
provision of a central liquidity fund. 
Despite a serious financial crisis in 1988 that undermined 
confidence in financial intermediaries, inflation that 
accelerated from about 8 percent in 1983 to more than 100 percent 
in 1990, overall economic stress, and the legacy of the credit 
union's tattered history, the project achieved remarkable 
results. By the end of 1992 these 15 credit unions had mobilized 
the equivalent of almost $US7 million in deposits, whereas before 
participating in the project only one of the credit unions 
attracted many deposits. Approximately 20 thousand new members 
joined these credit unions during the life of the project. The 
growth in deposits mobilized was especially impressive in 1991 
and 1992, partly showing the maturation of the project and partly 
reflecting the results of economic stabilization that reduced 
inflation rates to less than 5 percent both years. Approximately 
50 percent of the loans made were to operators of small firms, 
including some farmers. 
A major focus of the project was to deal with the principal-
agent problem. In large part, this was done by switching the 
credit unions from being borrower-based to organizations that 
were largely dominated by depositors. This stress on deposit 
mobilization imposed discipline on the credit unions and its 
members. Members were only willing to place their savings with 
the credit unions if the savings instruments offered were 
competitive and if the organization was well managed. While it 
had earlier been socially acceptable to abscond with credit union 
funds when outside money was involved, it became socially 
unacceptable to steal through loan defaults funds that were 
comprised of savings of local people. The full-time managers of 
the credit unions were also encouraged to behave in ways 
consistent with the interests of the members, particularly the 
depositors, through performance-based-compensation. Credit union 
profits and loan recovery were major components in this 
performance. In order to force the new national federation to 
focus on the well being of its member unions, the constitution of 
the new federation prohibited it from handling outside funds for 
on-lending to credit unions. 
The transaction cost problem was partly solved through 
deposit mobilization since savings performance provided valuable 
information to managers of credit unions on the creditworthiness 
of potential borrowers. Modern management techniques, improved 
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data processing practices, and scale and scope economies also 
helped moderate the increased transaction costs incurred in 
mobilizing deposits and in dealing with a larger and less well-
known membership. 
The prudential regulation problem was more difficult to 
resolve. As long as the credit unions handled few if any 
deposits, or if they were moribund, there was little need for 
prudential supervision. This issue became increasingly important 
as the amounts of deposits mobilized increased. In large part, 
the individuals providing the technical assistance, who were 
housed in the Central Bank, essentially provided this supervision 
during the life of the project. In late 1993 policy makers in 
the Dominican Republic were still struggling to establish an 
alternative regulatory mechanism. 
other Latin American countries 
In 1979-81 the Agency for International Development funded a 
program to help a cooperative bank and a handful of credit unions 
in Peru to mobilize deposits (Vogel 1982; Vogel 1984). Before 
and during the project inflation in the country was a serious 
problem and the economy was also severely stressed. Credit 
unions were slow in changing traditional interest rates of 12 
percent per year on loans, even when inflation accelerated to 
more than 50 percent per year. This resulted in negative real 
rates of interest being charged on loans and even higher negative 
real rates being paid on deposits. A rapid decapitalization of 
the credit unions, loss of membership, and large numbers of 
delinquent loans soon stifled most credit unions. 
Even though the credit unions were imploding, managers were 
slow to change interest rate policies, despite prodding by 
external advisors (Gadway 1982). Vogel (1982) provides four 
explanations for this: confusion caused by cooperative rhetoric 
that had traditionally stressed low interest rates on loans, 
insider borrowing by managers and people on the boards of 
directors, frequent turnover in management, and the expectation 
that a donor would rescue the credit unions by providing cheap 
funds--funding such as that provided by COLAC/IDB. The managers 
of the cooperative bank were more pragmatic about adjusting 
interest rates and soon were able to mobilize relatively large 
amounts of money from individuals, many of whom were not 
cooperative members. Several years after the project terminated, 
however, the bank was essentially destroyed through malfeasance. 
Several lessons can be drawn from the Peruvian experience: 
The first is that inflation and sticky interest rate policies can 
quickly turn credit union managers into rent seekers who look 
after their own well-being rather than that of the credit union, 
shareholders, or depositors--negative real rates of interest 
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destroy proper principal-agent relationships. The second lesson 
is that large amounts of deposits should not be mobilized without 
adequate prudential regulation. 
Additional research was also done on credit unions in 
Honduras during the late 1970s. Inflation there was less severe 
than in Peru, a number of the 88 credit unions in the country had 
loan recovery problems, and many of these cooperatives were 
facing financial crises. At the time of the research about 15 
percent of the total value of lending done by these credit unions 
came from outside sources, mainly the previously mentioned 
COLAC\IDB funds (Christen and Vogel 1984). Based on their 
research Burkett, Christen, and Vogel concluded that the 
opportunity to obtain a future loans was an important incentive 
for some people to save (Christen 1984; Vogel and Burkett 1986). 
savers quickly abandoned a cooperative by defaulting on their 
loans when it was no longer a dependable source of credit. 
Additional research by Poyo (1986) showed the importance of 
deposit mobilization in helping to strengthen credit unions. He 
also argued that the provision of outside funding, especially at 
concessionary rates, weakened the resolve of credit unions to 
mobilize deposits and that this made the cooperative a less 
dependable source of loans, thus fostering loan delinquency. 
More recent research in Costa Rica has clarified the 
importance of prudential regulation of credit unions (Chaves and 
Poyo 1989). Prior to 1987 credit unions in Costa Rica grew 
rapidly. They were successful in mobilizing relatively large 
amounts of deposits and also used substantial amounts of outside 
funds for on-lending to members. This success in mobilizing 
funds led the credit unions to construct new building, invest in 
non-financial businesses such as supermarkets, and to also lend 
to non-members outside their geographic area. 
A general financial crisis that began in 1987, however, 
stunted this growth. The crisis involved the failure of several 
major financial institutions which caused a run on credit unions, 
followed by a sharp increase in inflation and interest rates. 
This caused a liquidity crisis in credit unions because of 
withdrawals, their illiquid asset base, and growing delinquency. 
In part the delinquency was due to the poor quality of their loan 
portfolio, something that might have been partially avoided if 
these cooperatives had been properly supervised by prudential 
regulators instead of being lightly supervised by an organization 
that was part of the credit unions system. These problems led 
the Costa Ricans in the early 1990s to transfer prudential 
regulation of credit unions to the Central Bank. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Most credit unions in low-income countries are fragile. 
They typically have thin capital bases, often lack access to 
funds to meet liquidity shortfalls, have difficulties 
diversifying their risks, are often crippled by inflation, and 
are easily damaged when their members have economic reverses. 
credit unions also face dilemmas as they grow: they lose their 
informational advantages, they are forced to rely on paid rather 
than voluntary managers, and they must increasingly count on 
formal sanctions to enforce contracts. Growth compels credit 
unions to act increasingly like formal financial intermediaries 
rather than like self-help financial groups. With growth, the 
altruistic motives that may have led to the formation of the 
credit union must be replaced by hard-headed business decisions 
if the organization is to persist. This involves altering the 
ambiance in the cooperative from one that is borrower dominated 
to one that balances the concerns of depositors, shareholders, 
borrowers, and management. 
Principal-agent problems, transaction costs, and prudential 
regulation also become increasingly important as credit unions 
grow. Share capital, retained earnings, deposits, and external 
funds all present serious and somewhat different principal-agent 
problems. Complex incentives must be designed to address these 
problems. Likewise, when credit unions expand they must 
increasingly strive to moderate the growth in transaction costs--
both for the cooperative and for members--through financial 
innovations and by achieving scope and scale economies. 
For a variety of reasons, credit unions should depend on 
deposit mobilization for growth. Deposits are important to 
credit unions because many people wish to save, because deposits 
come with no political strings attached, because deposit 
mobilization leads to scope economies, because saving is a 
natural step in becoming creditworthy, and because the 
combination of deposits and lending enhances loan recovery. It 
is unfair, nevertheless, for large numbers of people to place 
their deposits in organizations that are not prudentially 
regulated. 12 Even under the best of circumstances, prudential 
regulation will increase transaction costs and diminish some of 
the informational and self-regulatory advantages that rudimentary 
credit unions enjoy. 
Credit unions are alluring channels for government and donor 
funding. They are private sector, they largely deal with people 
of modest means, and they ostensively operate on democratic 
12A similar justification might be presented for prudential 
regulation of credit unions that handle government or donor 
funds. 
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principles. Given this, it is easy for policy makers to conclude 
that additional funding would allow credit unions to lend more to 
the types of individuals who are targets of donor or government 
affection--operators of microenterprises, for example. Earlier 
experience, however, suggests that funders should be mindful of 
how their intrusion affect the internal equilibrium of these 
self-help groups. The long-run goal of enhancing the 
sustainability and efficiency of the credit union should 
accompany the short-run goal of providing more loans to 
microentrepreneurs. 
Under the worst of circumstances, outside funding could 
discourage deposit mobilization, transform members into 
beneficiaries, convert managers and boards of directors into rent 
seekers, and reorient managers of second and third tier 
organizations away from members to outside funding sources. 
Under the best of circumstances outside funding should impose 
only modest additional transaction costs on the credit union and 
its members, avoid fostering dependency on outside funding, and 
employ incentives that induce the management and members to act 
in ways that foster the well-being of the credit union. The 
following guidelines may help foster these desirable 
circumstances: 
outside funding should done in ways that encourage credit 
unions to mobilize additional deposits and share capital. 
Credit unions should be encouraged to charge interest rates 
on their loans that cover the cost of funds, loan losses, 
transactions costs, and the erosion of purchasing power due 
to inflation. To do this nominal interest rates must be 
flexible and adjust to changing conditions. 
• Loans should be based on creditworthiness rather than on 
need. 
As they expand, credit unions should be encouraged to 
strengthen management, improve data processing, and seek 
financial innovations that reduce transaction costs. 
• Especially when credit unions are mobilizing significant 
amounts of deposits and handling other public funds, they 
should also be prudentially regulated by an agency that is 
capable of doing such supervision and that is not involved 
in the promotion of credit unions. 
19 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Timothy Besley and Tomothy W. Guinnane. 1993. 
"Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative 
with Theory and a Test." Unpublished paper, Department of 
Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
April 19. 
Baydas, Mayada M. and Carlos E. Cuevas. 1990. "The Demand for. 
Funds from Rural Credit Unions in Togo." Savings and 
Development 14:371-380. 
Bierman, Russell W., Karen M. Poe, and Ronald E. Babel. 1977. 
"Evaluation Project 689-0391 Regional Organizations 
Development: African Co-operative Savings and Credit 
Association; Directed Agricultural Production Credit. 11 
Unpublished report prepared by the Agency for International 
Development in Washington, D.C., June. 
Boomgard, James. 1989. "A.I.D. Microenterprise Stock-Taking: 
Synthesis Report." Report prepared for the Agency for 
International Development by Development Alternatives, 
Washington, D.C, March. 
Branch, Brian. 1992. "Prudential Management: Protection of 
Savings at The Credit Union Level.'' Unpublished report 
prepared the World Council of Credit Unions and The Ohio 
State University, Columbus, Ohio, February 8. 
Chaves, Rodrigo A. 1993. ''Diseno Institucional de Organizaciones: 
El Caso de Los Bancomunales." Unpublished paper Department 
of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio 
state University, Columbus, Ohio. 
Chaves, Rodrigo A. 1993. "The Behavior of Cooperatives and Other 
Client-Owned Financial Intermediaries: A Contribution to The 
Theory of Organizations." Unpublished Ph.D dissertations, 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
Chaves, Rodrigo A. and Jeffrey Poyo. 1989. "Financial Reforms in 
The Credit Union System of Costa Rica." Economics and 
Sociology Occasional Paper No. 1616, Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio, September. 
Chickering, A. Lawrence and Mohamed Salhdine (eds.). 1991. The 
Silent Revolution: The Informal Sector in Five Asian and 
Near Eastern Countries. San Francisco, California: ICS 
Press. 
20 
Christen, Robert P. 1984. "The Causes of Default and Delinquency 
in Open Honduran Credit Unions." Unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
Christen, Robert P. and Robert c. Vogel. 1984. "The Importance of 
Domestic Resource Mobilization in Averting Financial Crises: 
The Case of Credit Unions in Honduras." Unpublished paper, 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 
Cuevas, Carlos E. 1992. "Rural Finance Experiences in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America: A Comparative Assessment." 
Unpublished report prepared for the World Bank, Department 
of Agricultural Economic and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio, August. 
Deschamps, Jean-Jacques. 1989. "Credit for The Rural Poor: The 
Experience in Six African Countries." Unpublished report 
prepared for the Agency for International Development by 
Development Alternatives, Washington, D.C. February. 
de Soto, Hernando. 1989. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution 
in the Third World New York: Harper and Row. 
Dublin, Jack and Selma Dublin. 1983. Credit Unions in a Changing 
World: The Tanzania-Kenya Experience. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press. 
Gadway, John F. 1982. "El Proceso Inflacionario y Su Incidencia 
en La Cooperative de Ahorro y Credito "Proctectora LTDA. 
261" Huancayo, Peru." Unpublished report prepared for the 
Federacion Nacional de Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito de 
Bolivia by the Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 
February. 
Graham, Douglas. 1987. "Banks Versus Cooperatives: Research in 
Niger Favors Credit Unions." World Reporter, May, p.33-35. 
Izumida, Yoichi. 1992. "The Kou in Japan: A Precursor of Modern 
Finance." In Informal Finance in Low-income Countries, 
edited by Dale W Adams and Delbert A. Fitchett. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 99.165-180. 
Jensen M. and W. Meckling. 1976. "Theory of The Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and ownership Structure." Journal of 
Financial Economics 3:303-360. 
21 
Keeler, Hayes and others. 1973. "Evaluation of The Directed 
Agricultural Production Credit Program in Ecuador." In Small 
Farmer Credit in Ecuador, Volume 4, A.I.D. Spring Review of 
Small Farmer Credit, Agency for International Development, 
Washington, D.C, February. 
Kilby, Peter, Carl E. Liedholm and Richard L. Meyer. 1984. 
"Working Capital and Nonfarm Rural Enterprises." In 
Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit, edited by 
Dale W Adams and others. Boulder 1 Colorado: Westview Press, 
pp. 266-283. 
Liedholm 1 Carl and Donald Mead. 1987, "Small-scale Industries in 
Developing Countries: Empirical Evidence and Policy 
Implications." MSU International Development Paper No. 9. 
East Lansing, Michigan": Michigan State University. 
Levitsky, J. and R.N. Prasad. 1987. "Credit Schemes for Small and 
Medium Enterprises." World Bank Technical Paper No. 58, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Marion, J. Peter. 1987. "Building Successful Financial Systems: 
The Role of Credit Unions in Financial Sector Development." 
Unpublished paper prepared by the World Council of Credit 
Unions, Madison, Wisconsin 1 September. 
Magill, John H. 1991. "Credit Unions: A Formal Sector Alternative 
for Financing Microenterprise Development. 11 GEMINI Working 
Paper No. 22, Development Alternatives Inc 1 Washington, 
D.C. , September. 
McGuire 1 John J. and others. 1990. "An Evaluation of COLAC: The 
Confederation of Latin American Credit Unions." Unpublished 
report prepared for the Inter-American Development Bank by 
the Inter-American Management Consulting Corporation/ 
Washington, D.C. October. 
Meyer 1 Richard L. and Geetha Nagarajan. 1989. "Annotated 
Bibliography on Agricultural Credit and Rural Savings: XII 
(A Special Issue on Microenterprise Financing." Unpublished 
manuscript, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology, The Ohio State University 1 Columbusr Ohio, June. 
Mindock, Kevin L. 1983. "An Evaluation of the Credit Union 
Development Project." Unpublished report prepared for the 
Agency for International Development in Lesotho, September 
16. 
22 
Pollard, Stephen K. and others. 1992. "Midterm Evaluation of 
Strengthening Local Financial Sector Through a Pan-African 
Credit Union System Approach (ACCOSCA)." Unpublished report 
prepared for the World Council of Credit Unions, Madison, 
Wisconsin, April. 
Poyo Jeffrey. 1986. "Development Without Dependence: Financial 
Repression and Deposit Mobilization among The Rural Credit 
Unions in Honduras." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New 
York. 
Poyo, Jeffrey. 1993. "Expansion of Rural Financial Services: The 
Development of Community Based Rural credit Union Network." 
Unpublished paper prepared by the Inter-American Development 
Bank, Washington, D.C., 
Poyo, Jeffrey. 1992a. "Regulation y Supervision Prudential de Las 
Cooperativeas de Ahorro y Credito en La Republica 
Dominicana." In Republica Dominicana: Mercados Financieros 
Rurales y Movilizacion de Depositos, edited by Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 
pp. 255-280. 
Poyo, Jeffrey. 1992b. "Relaciones de Agencia, El Banco Agricola y 
Las Cooperatives Rurales de Ahorro y credito." In Republica 
Dominicana: Mercados Financieros Rurales y Movilizacion de 
Depositos, edited by Claudio Gonzalez-Vega. Columbus, Ohio: 
The Ohio State University, pp. 93-121. 
Poyo, Jeffrey, Nelson Aguillera Alfred, and Claudio Gonzalez-
Vega. 1992. "Informacion, Costas de Transacciones y La 
Ventaja Comparativa de Las Cooperativas Rurales de Ahorro y 
Credito." In Republica Dominicana: Mercados Financieros 
Rurales y Movilizacion de Depositos, edited by Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 
pp. 221-254. 
Vogel, Robert c. 1982. "Final Report on The Peru Savings 
Mobilization Campaign Project, July 1979 through December 
1981." Unpublished report prepared for the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio, February. 
Vogel, Robert C. 1984. "Savings Mobilization: The Forgotten Half 
of Rural Finance." In Undermining Rural Development with 
Cheap Credit, Edited by Dale W Adams, Douglas H. Graham and 
J.D. Von Pischke, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p~. 
248-265. 
23 
Vogel, Robert c. 1988b. "The Role of Groups, Credit Unions and 
other Cooperatives in Rural Lending." Unpublished paper 
prepared for the Agricultural and Rural Development 
Department of the World Bank, Washington, D.C, August. 
Vogel, Robert c. and Paul Burkett. 1986. "Deposit Mobilization in 
Developing Countries: The Importance of Reciprocity in 
Lending." Journal of Developing Areas 20:425-438. 
Webster, Leila. 1989. "World Bank Lending for Small and Medium 
Enterprises: Fifteen Years of Experience." Industry and 
Energy Department Working Paper, Industry Series Paper No. 
20. Washington, D.C: World Bank. 
24 

